Most auditor client management (ACM) negotiations occur between audit partners and senior client management, however, audit managers also often attempt to resolve issues with client management. Given the importance of ACM negotiation to the resulting financial statements, an understanding of whether the intended negotiation strategies of partners and managers are the same or different is important due to the findings of prior negotiation research that demonstrates that if different strategies are employed, different negotiation outcomes will result. One of the key features of the ACM setting is that audit partners have more power/status and experience than most audit managers. Generic negotiation research, however, provides conflicting predictions about the use of integrative (win-win) strategies based on experience level alone or power/status alone, and to date these two dimensions have yet to be jointly studied in that literature. In our study, we find, consistent with the power/status hypothesis, that audit managers are more likely to intend to use integrative strategies, however, the evidence is stronger for the expanding the agenda subset of integrative strategies than for the problem solving subset of integrative strategies. In contrast, generic negotiation research on distributive (dividing a fixed set of resources) negotiation provides the same directional predictions for partner/manager strategy differences for both experience and power/status. Based on that literature, we predict and find evidence that partners intend to use the contending (more focused on achieving their own goals) strategy to a greater extent than managers and managers intend to use the compromising and concessionary strategies to a greater extent than partners. However, these findings are qualified by unexpected interactions with important accounting contextual factors. The generic negotiation literature did not suggest that negotiation context would interact with our level hypotheses. Implications for both practice and research are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Auditor-client management (ACM) negotiations frequently occur between the audit partner and the Chief Financial Officer, but there is also evidence that the audit manager attempts to negotiate resolutions to issues in order to increase audit efficiency, to increase the manager"s image of competence with the partner or in response to time pressures (Gibbins et al. 2007 ).
Given the importance of ACM negotiations to the resulting financial statements shown in previous work in the ACM negotiation area (Gibbins et al. 2001; McCracken et al. 2008; BameAldred and Kida 2007; Hatfield et al. 2008; Brown and Wright 2008; Beattie et al. 2004) , as well as the tendency for managers to conduct these negotiations in place of the partners, it is important to determine whether partners and managers intend to utilize similar or different negotiation strategies. From a practice perspective, if audit partners" and managers" intended negotiation strategies are different, then audit effectiveness may be compromised when managers undertake ACM negotiations. However, if the intended negotiation strategies of the partner and manager are the same, then there would be evidence to suggest that improvements in audit efficiency may be achieved by having managers undertake the ACM negotiations. Furthermore, from a research perspective, if there are differences in intended negotiation strategies between partners and managers, then results from prior studies that utilize managers as participants may not generalize to audit partners.
Partners differ from managers on multiple dimensions, two of which are closely intertwined: years of experience and hierarchal power or status based on position in the audit firm (we denote these as "level" in the remainder of the paper). Both of these dimensions suggest theoretically that there may be differences in negotiation strategy based on level. However,the predictions from the generic negotiation research for integrative ("win-win" or achieving the goals of both parties to the negotiation) strategy use based on the relative amount of negotiation experience are in the opposite direction to the predictions based on the relative differences in power/status. That is, the generic negotiation literature related to experience (e.g., Thompson 1990 ) suggests that negotiators with increased experience (i.e., partners) will intend to utilize integrative negotiation strategies more than negotiators with less experience (i.e., managers), however, the generic negotiation literature related to power/status (e.g., De Dreu and van Kleef 2004) suggests that negotiators with lower power/status (i.e., mangers) will intend to utilize integrative negotiation strategies more than negotiators with high power/status (i.e., partners).
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For distributive ("win-lose" or concentrating on achieving one sides" goals in the negotiation) strategies, however, both the experience and power/status generic negotiation literatures make similar directional predictions about differences in strategy usage by level.
In an accounting context, Trotman et al. (2007) provide initial evidence that auditor rank impacts auditor pre-negotiation judgments, as they find that partners plan to take a tougher stand than managers, in terms of the goal set for the amount of adjustment to the financial statements, when heading into the negotiations. Trotman et al. (2007) , however, do not investigate the impact of rank on the negotiation strategies and tactics that the auditor intends to apply as the same dollar figure write down may be achieved by utilizing different negotiation strategies and tactics. By directly examining these intended negotiation strategies, the current study is able to provide direct evidence regarding the differences, or similarities, in negotiation strategies between levels (partner versus manager), thus, complementing Trotman et al." s research that showed differences in pre-negotiation goals. Furthermore, Gibbins et al. (2001) document that 1 For an examination of relative bargaining power between audit firm and client management see Iyer and Rama (2004) . their term for hierarchal differences, interpersonal relationship in audit firm, was of moderate importance to the negotiation issue and outcome (Table 6 ) and also was one of two features (out of 29) associated with all four of the early stages of their process model (Table 8) . Hence, we examine these level differences in an experiment where 73 audit partners and 105 audit managers are asked to indicate their likelihood of using different negotiation strategies" tactics in an upcoming negotiation with a client.
We find, consistent with our power/status based predictions, that managers and partners have differing intentions with respect to the use of integrative strategies. Specifically, partners are less likely than managers to intend to add other issues to the negotiation in order to resolve issues. We also find that partners are more likely to intend to use the contending strategy and less likely to intend to use the concessionary and compromising strategies than managers.
We note that the distributive conclusions require qualification as the accounting context factors embedded in the case (prior relationship with client and client initial accounting position flexibility) appear to interact with level (partner versus manager). An exception, however, is the seldom used concessionary strategy, where we consistently find the managers to be more likely to intend to use this strategy than the partners. Interestingly, our examination of these accounting context interactions suggests that the partners are more sensitive to the accounting contextual features of ACM negotiation than the managers are.
Overall, our research suggests that our "level" variable, auditor experience and power/status, is a relevant and important variable to be considered when carrying out ACM negotiation research. From a practice perspective, partners need to be aware of circumstances where managers negotiate with client management, since the tactics employed and potentially the outcomes obtained by the manager may be different than if the partner had been involved. In addition, it can be concluded that managers are not good proxies for partners when carrying out experimental research. In particular, combining the two levels in the same experiment may produce difficult to interpret (or null) results due to participant mix. This research also reinforces the importance of accounting context to ACM negotiation research (Gibbins et al. 2001 , Gibbins et al. 2007 Hatfield et al. 2008; Ng and Tan 2003) by highlighting that level is an important contextual factor to be considered and by the unexpected finding that contextual factors specific to the accounting case interacted with level. Overall, our results suggest that unquestioned use of managers as surrogates for partners may compromise both substantive accounting negotiation effectiveness as well as conclusions drawn from experimental audit research.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the relevant research and our research hypotheses. The third section contains the experimental method, including the experimental setting, design, variables, and participants. Our results are presented in the fourth section. We conclude, discuss limitations and implications of this research in the fifth section.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Partners differ from managers on at least three dimensions: 1) they are more experienced (e.g., Waller and Felix 1984) ; 2) they occupy a position of higher status and perceived power in the public accounting firm (e.g., Dirsmith et al. 1997) ; and 3) they are exposed to greater economic risks given their equity investment in the firm. The latter factor, economic risk, has been studied extensively in the broader audit literature under various guises, such as loss of independence (e.g., the "lowballing" literature starting with DeAngelo 1981) and reputation risk (e.g., the litigation literature starting with Palmrose 1987) . These effects from the additional economic risk an audit partner faces tend to offset one another, making it difficult to distinguish their individual impact on partners relative to the managers, especially in the ACM negotiation setting.
2 Hence, in this paper, we study what we believe are the two most salient features that differentiate partners from managers with respect to ACM negotiations: greater experience and higher power/status. Furthermore, while we recognize that conceptually we can distinguish between greater experience and higher/power status, the practice of public accounting firms results in these two dimensions being highly correlated, with the culture of promotion or outplacement (albeit with longer initial retention goals today than in the past) still resulting in a manager class that is younger, less experienced and with much lower power and status in the firm than those in the partner class (e.g., Pratt and Beaulieu 1992) .
Prior generic negotiation research has concluded that, "Experience (through trial-anderror learning) can lead to superior negotiator performance" (Neale and Northcraft 1990, 71) . As such, partners likely have more refined and higher quality negotiation strategies than managers.
For example, given their experience and ultimate audit opinion authority, partners are likely to be more sensitive to the relevant information for consideration in an ACM negotiation as compared to managers. Supporting this conjecture, prior audit research has found that judgments from auditors with a relative high degree of task experience (e.g., partners) may not exhibit dilution due to irrelevant information as compared to the judgments of auditors with less task experience (Shelton 1999) . In addition, Brown and Johnstone (2007) find that auditor negotiators with a greater amount of task experience generate a larger number and range of outcome options.
2 However, given that past research suggests that incentives for the negotiation and its outcome may vary with accounting context, we do vary the accounting context (the prior relationship and the flexibility of the client management"s initial accounting position) in our experiment. Note, we are not manipulating incentives by changing the accounting context, but rather, we deliberately attempt to hold the auditor"s motivation (e.g., perception of litigation risk) with respect to the negotiation constant across the four contexts. We present evidence consistent with this assertion as part of our manipulation checks.
Hence, if partners and managers, given the level differences due to experience and power/status, intend to utilize different negotiation tactics, then the increase in audit efficiency achieved by substituting the lower cost manager in an ACM negotiation may result in sacrificed auditor negotiation performance (Hatfield et al. 2008; Sanchez et al. 2007; Trotman et al. 2005 ). As such, examining intended negotiation strategies is critical as any differences between how the partner and manager might approach a negotiation may be of concern since the generic literature shows that the negotiation strategies employed often affect the negotiated outcome (Brett et al. 1998; Greenhalgh and Chapman 1998; Lytle et al. 1999; Olekalns and Smith 2000) . 3 Further, there is initial descriptive evidence in auditing that demonstrates this planned strategy-outcome linkage. Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) find that the strategies that auditors said they picked going into a negotiation affected their expectations of what would happen as a result of the negotiation. In addition, Trotman et al. (2007) also argue the importance of initial negotiation strategy on the ultimate negotiation outcome. Thus, prior research in both the generic and auditor negotiation literatures suggest there is a strong intended strategy to outcome linkage, which, in the context of ACM negotiation, means the intended strategy potentially impacts the financial statements.
The negotiation literature (e.g., Bazerman 1986) defines two main types of negotiation:
distributive and integrative. The main difference is that distributive strategies focus on dividing a "fixed pie" (or amount) of resources among the negotiating parties, whereas integrative negotiation strategies involve expanding the "pie" of resources by making mutually beneficial tradeoffs ("expanding the agenda") or via joint "problem solving". We discuss each main strategy in more detail below.
Integrative Negotiation Strategies
The "expanding the agenda" strategy involves adding new issues to the negotiation, such that the resolution of the overall issue set has gains for both parties. Given the larger set of issues, the negotiators can trade off on issues in order to obtain the outcome required on their main issue (Neale and Bazerman 1991) . For example, an auditor may bring other individually immaterial adjustments to the negotiation table that s/he had previously planned to waive (e.g., Sanchez et al. 2007; Hatfield et al. 2008) . The second integrative negotiation strategy of "problem solving" involves learning more about the underlying interests of both parties and searching for new solutions to meet those interests. From the viewpoint of the auditor, problem solving involves finding a new solution that essentially preserves the auditor"s original desired outcome while allowing the client to feel that it also achieved its objective (e.g., Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007).
Prior research has shown that negotiation experience differentially affects different subsets of negotiation strategies. In their review of studies that found distributive or "fixed pie"
perceptions, Carroll and Payne (1991) note that, "…it takes significant experience for subjects to transcend the fixed pie and recognize the integrative potential in the situation" (p.12). Using an experimental market study with student participants, Bazerman et al. (1985) found that negotiators tended to use distributive tactics early in the market setting; however, as participants gained experience in the market, they were able to overcome this fixed-pie perspective and become more integrative, as evidenced by joint profit. Neale and Northcraft (1986) compared students to real estate agents and found that both the agents and the students became more integrative, as measured by dyadic joint profit, with experience in the task. The agents, however, moved to the integrative behavior more quickly than the students. 4 Thus, given that partners have a greater overall level of audit experience and that ACM negotiation experience predominately occurs at the partner level (Gibbins et al. 2001; McCracken et al. 2008) , we can assume that partners have a greater amount of ACM negotiation experience than managers, and thus, relative to managers will be more likely to intend to employ the integrative strategies. Hence, based on the experience analysis, we predict:
H1a: Audit partners will intend to employ the integrative strategies' tactics relatively more than audit managers.
On the other hand, power or negotiator status also plays a role in negotiation preparation.
Research on the effects of relative power in negotiations suggests that lower power individuals are more likely to employ the more effortful integrative strategies due to their inability to credibly threaten their negotiation opponent. Thus, they have a greater need to resort to tactics other than distributive (Mannix and Neale 1993; Shapiro and Bies 1994; Kim 1997; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; Magee et al. 2007 ). For example, Mannix and Neale (1993) found that negotiators with a relative low degree of power made more integrative final offers; they interpret this result as suggesting that, "their power disadvantage may force them to consider more carefully the options available to them" (p.130). In an ACM setting, partners would have a greater ability than the managers to exercise power given their relative position in the firm (Pratt and Beaulieu 1992) . In addition, partners would typically be involved in the more serious and complex ACM negotiations that would more likely require threats of a qualified opinion (a distributive strategy). The managers, in contrast, having less power and status, would have less credible threats or arguments and therefore would be more apt to invoke integrative strategies to resolve client issues (and avoid elevating the issue to the next level). The managers, therefore, on a relative basis, will be more likely to utilize the integrative strategies, according to the power/status literature. Thus, based on a power/status analysis we predict:
H1b: Audit managers will intend to employ the integrative strategies' tactics relatively more than audit partners.
Distributive Negotiation Strategies
The main distributive negotiation strategies include contending, compromising, and conceding. Contending tactics attempt "to make the other party make concessions or to resist similar (contending) efforts by others" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 30) . At an extreme, contending negotiation tactics may include insisting that the other party comply. Prior research suggests that differential power influences the use of contending tactics; for example, Lewis and Fry (1977) and Carnevale and Isen (1986) have examined how dominance or the perception of dominance affects negotiation behavior and outcomes. Both of these studies found that individuals who perceived themselves as being dominant (i.e., more powerful) in a negotiation utilized contending negotiation tactics. 5 More directly, De Dreu (1995) found that a negotiator communicated more threats (i.e., contended) when his/her power was relatively higher than his/her opponent"s power (see also Michener et al. 1975 ). In addition, De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) found that less powerful negotiators asked fewer leading questions and made lower initial demands than higher power negotiators did. Thompson (1990) also investigated how differences in negotiation experience impacted negotiation behavior and found that, "Highly experienced bargainers made high initial demands, offered few concessions, and made offers that were low in value to the other party" (p.88).
Collectively, the above studies suggest that negotiation experience and power reinforce each other, and thus, suggest a greater planned use of the contending strategy by the more experienced and powerful partners, relative to the managers. Hence, we predict:
H2: Audit partners will intend to employ the contending strategy's tactics relatively more than audit managers.
The second distributive negotiation strategy, compromising, seeks to find a mutually agreed upon solution or middle ground. 6 The third distributive negotiation strategy, conceding, involves changing one"s position so that it provides less benefit to oneself, and therefore more benefit to the other party (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 28) . Note that, although conceding may not sound useful for an auditor in an ACM setting, the timing of the concession, the amount of the concession, and the resistance offered before the concession, among other factors, have been shown to affect the outcome of a distributive negotiation (e.g., Komorita and Esser 1975; Olekalns and Smith 2000) . Initial evidence in accounting also provides collaborative findings for the usefulness and applicability of concessionary strategies (Hatfield et al. 2008; Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003) .
In contrast to the contending strategies, Thompson (1990) shows that less experienced negotiators are more likely to offer early concessions than more experienced negotiators.
Furthermore, more experienced negotiators are less likely to match concessionary tactics. Michener et al. (1975) found that participants in the stronger power position relative to their confederate, "…did not concede in response to concessions initiated by the confederate…when subjects occupied the weak power position, their concession rate mirrored the concession rate of the confederate, in accord with the reciprocity hypothesis" (p. 62). In addition, descriptive selfreport research suggests that the lower power party and the higher power party report the above behavior both for themselves and the other party in sales and production interactions, especially 6 See Druckman (1994) for a meta-analysis of compromising behavior in negotiation research.
for concessionary behavior (Nauta et al. 2001) . Overall, this research on compromising and concessionary strategies suggests that the less experienced and less powerful managers will concede and compromise more often than the partners. 7 Thus, we predict:
H3: Audit managers will intend to employ the compromising and concessionary strategies' tactics relatively more than audit partners.
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD The Experimental Setting
Our experimental case was based on a published case of an actual negotiation (Kleinman and Palmon 2000) . We adapted it (with permission) for developments since the case was written and also to incorporate the explicit issues of the ACM setting that we wanted to capture for this study as well as another study that was interested in studying the appropriateness of audit partner initial negotiation strategies. 8 By manipulating the broad ACM context in the case, we are also able to incorporate the effects of accounting context on audit partner and manager judgments as past research in the ACM negotiation area has suggested that the accounting context is important to the negotiation process (Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2007; Hatfield et al. 2008; Ng and Tan 2003) . Importantly, the embedded context variables (i.e., the initial client accounting position and the background of the auditor client management relationship) are not of direct interest to this study; they simply enhance the investigation of how our variable of interest, level, may interact with the different types of ACM contexts that an auditor may encounter. As such, we advance no hypotheses with respect to these case context variables as we have no theory to predict the nature of their interaction with our independent variable, level.
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The case and experimental instrument were extensively pretested over a three year period involving numerous participants, including several hundred students, 50 audit seniors and a dozen audit partners, none of whom took part in this study. Our pre-testing process initially had six audit partners read the case and answer the questions to provide feedback regarding the realism of the case and whether the partners were interpreting the questions as was intended. The audit seniors and students were then employed to test the clarity of the experimental materials and to further ensure that the questions were being interpreted as we had anticipated. Finally, we had six more audit partners read the case and respond to the questions to ensure that the revised case and questions had maintained their realism and clarity and were still being interpreted as intended.
The experimental materials required participants to assume the role of an audit partner preparing for a negotiation with an audit client over a disagreement regarding a potential overstatement of net income. The audit team believed that net income was overstated by a material amount (up to 16 percent versus a 5 percent materiality level), some of which was due to clear-cut errors (7.6 percent of net income) and the remainder being due to differences in estimates (up to 8.4 percent of net income), such as the amount of allowance for doubtful accounts, inventory obsolescence write-downs, and capitalization of interest costs.
9 Gibbins et al. (2009) develop and test a complete set of hypotheses about the effects of these accounting context variables on audit partner judgments in a 140 audit partner experiment. We have no reason to believe that these variables should interact with level, our variable of interest in this study. Furthermore, it was at the insistence of the participating firm that we collected data from managers as they wanted to see if managers intended to negotiate differently than partners, hence providing a direct real world motivation for our research question.
The participants, randomly assigned to their specific context condition, were first asked to read the case and then to rate how likely they would be to use each of the five tactics related to the five negotiation strategies (expanding the agenda, problem solving, contending, compromising and conceding) in their upcoming discussions with the client to resolve the accounting issue discussed above. Following that, participants completed demographic and extensive manipulation check questions.
To increase the realism of the case, other contextual features identified as being important to the ACM setting in Gibbins et al. (2001) were held constant across the experimental conditions. Specifically, the audit firm is a conservative international firm; the company is an average size public company for the office but is a minor client for the firm overall; partner compensation is firm-wide rather than based on individual partners" client portfolios; the company is described as a conservative financial reporter that is involved in merger discussions;
and the board, audit committee and the concurring (or review) partner are considered to be effective. In addition, and as discussed above, the nature of the ACM relationship and the audit team"s perception of the client"s initial accounting position flexibility were discussed in the case; further details will be provided below.
Experimental Design
We use a 2 X 2 X 2 between subjects factorial design, with level (partner, manager) being measured while client management"s initial accounting position flexibility (inflexible, flexible), and ACM relationship (cordial, contentious) were manipulated. We test and control for the influence of ACM relationship type, client position flexibility, as well as the interactions of these with each other in our analysis. As such, the only independent variable of direct interest is level.
Hence, any interactions of context variables (i.e., client management"s initial accounting position flexibility and background of the ACM relationship) are only of interest insofar as their differential impact between levels (partner versus manager).
Independent Variable

Level
The audit partners and managers are all from one international accounting firm. This participant choice was made deliberately in order to ensure that within firm compensation (e.g., Carcello et al. 2000) , training (e.g., Bonner 1990), audit structure (e.g., Kinney 1986 ) and other environmental factors were held constant to the extent possible. This choice results in reduced noise in the experimental data, and thus, enhanced between level comparisons of responses.
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Hence, our independent variable is the self reported level in the firm, partner or manager.
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Case Context Variables
As stated previously, there are two ACM contextual variables in the case that have been identified by prior research as being important to ACM negotiations (Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2007 ). These were not expected to interact with our level variable (see footnote 9).
Flexibility of client management's initial accounting position
The flexibility of the client management"s initial accounting position is incorporated into the second-last paragraph of the case. In the flexible version, the audit team believes that the client management has a range of net income numbers that it would be able to "live with", although probably not as low as the audit team"s initial preferred position. In contrast, in the 10 There is a cost and benefit to all design choices, however, as experiments generalize via theory, and given that there is no reason to believe that firm differences would interact with the theory in this situation (and given few, if any, firm differences have been reported in audit research experiments that were not focused on known firm structure issues directly), we believe the tradeoff we made was worthwhile. We acknowledge this as a limitation in our conclusion. 11 We excluded the 19 principals that took part in our experiment. The firm had only recently started to use the title and firm management had no expectations of whether the principals would act more like managers or more like partners. In addition, there were too few principals to carry out an independent analysis of their responses. Adding them to either the partner or the manager group weakened the results, suggesting that they showed characteristics of being in between the two levels.
inflexible version, the team reports that the client management is strongly committed to the unaudited net income number, and that it will be difficult to move client management from its initial accounting position.
Nature of the ACM relationship
The nature of the ACM relationship is woven into the case. In the cordial relationship version, the relationship is long term and has mutual respect; the chief financial officer is not a professional accountant and faces staff turnover; the internal audit department is considered competent; and the services provided by the audit firm are valued by the client management. In contrast, the relationship in the contentious version is only three years old and has consistently been difficult to manage; the chief financial officer is a professional accountant and has strong beliefs regarding GAAP interpretation; the internal audit department is relatively weak; and the services provided by the audit firm are not valued by the client management.
Dependent Variables: Auditor's Likelihood of Employing a Strategy's Tactics
We asked participants to indicate their likelihood of employing each of 25 tactics that underlie the two integrative and three distributive strategies in the upcoming discussion with the client on an eight-point scale ranging from 0 ("Very unlikely to use") to 7 ("Very likely to use"). 12 The ACM negotiation specific tactics are based on an inventory of tactics validated by Rahim (1983) as part of the development of an instrument for identifying individual differences in negotiating style (see also Goodwin 2002) . Part of Gibbins et al."s (2009) pre-testing ensured that Rahim"s five original strategies were reflected in the revised instrument and that the five tactics loaded onto the five strategies in the manner envisioned by the underlying theory.
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12 Two random orders of tactics were employed in unclassified lists of 25 tactics and no differences due to order were found. 13 We found a five factor solution and the individual tactics loaded to the factors as expected. We did not use factor scores in our analysis as factor scores are sample specific. Thus, we employed the raw scores in our data analysis.
Participants
In total, 73 audit partners and 105 audit managers from one large international public accounting firm participated in this study, of whom 70 and 99 respectively provided a full panel of data (the 73 audit partners are from the same firm as the managers in this study and comprise a subset of the 140 audit partners in Gibbins et al. (2009) , all manager data was specifically collected for this study). We used all data available to test each hypothesis. The participating firm identified all appropriate partner and manager participants. The auditor participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions and completed the experimental materials at the firm"s annual partner and manager meetings, with a researcher present. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our audit partner and manager sample, and shows that there is a limited number of audit managers with audit experience similar to the audit partners (i.e.,there were 14 managers with a substantial overlap in experience with partners and six young partners in our sample).
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RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The case context variables (past relationship and accounting position flexibility) and a key background item (auditor"s motivation) were the subject of manipulation checks. Eight items were used to measure the perceived relationship between auditor and client management
Additional analyses using averages in place of total scores for strategy aggregate comparisons made no difference to the results. 14 Reperforming the analysis, with managers who have less than ten years experience eliminated, results in somewhat weaker, but still significant (or marginally significant) findings for creative problem solving, contending, and compromising, similar to what is reported in the text. These findings support our insights that suggest it is not experience alone that results in negotiation differences, but rather, experience combined with "power of position" (i.e.,being a "partner"). We note, this finding occurred in our sample despite the longest serving managers (six who have been there over 20 years) who must have some source of implicit power in order to survive for that long in an "up or out" culture. 
Test of H1 Integrative Strategy Usage
To investigate the level main effect and to test the rival hypotheses H1a, which posited partners would intend to use integrative strategies" tactics more than managers, and H1b, which posited the opposite, a 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA (level X relationship X flexibility) was conducted where the dependent variables were limited to the two integrative strategies" ten tactics (five "expanding the agenda" and five "problem solving"). We find the expected significant level main effect (Wilks" λ=0.867, F(10,158)=2.43, p<0.02, results not tabulated), with all other main effects and interactions insignificant.
In order to compare individual integrative strategies, we conducted further MANOVA"s that separated the integrative strategies into "expanding the agenda" and "problem solving". The MANOVA in Table 2 Panel B shows that for the "expanding the agenda" strategy"s tactics, there is the expected significant level main effect (Wilks" λ=0.933, F(5,164)=2.36, p<0.05) and no other effects are significant. Table 3 Panel A shows the expanding the agenda tactic means by level along with the results for the differences between means tests. Specifically, Table 3 Panel A demonstrates that more powerful partners were less likely to intend to use the "expanding the agenda" strategy"s tactics in this case than the less powerful managers, and thus, the results are in the direction predicted by the power/status hypothesis, H1b.
The results for the "problem solving" strategy"s tactics are reported in the MANOVA in likely to intend to use the problem solving tactics than the partners, with two of them approaching conventional significance levels (CP(3) and CP (5)). Thus, our results for the problem solving strategy"s tactics suggest that the overall pattern weakly supports H1b.
In summary, we find that level in firm can be important in ACM negotiations with respect to the planned use of integrative negotiation strategies, especially for the "expanding the agenda" strategy. Our results support our predictions based on the generic negotiation power/ status research with respect to the use of integrative strategies rather than predictions based on the generic negotiation experience research. The ACM setting provides a provocative situation for testing these conflicting predictions as the parties with more experience and power/status are the same person, a combination that has not yet been examined in the generic negotiation literature.
Test of H2 Contending Strategy Usage
To test H2"s prediction that audit partners are more likely than managers to use the contending strategy"s tactics, a 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA (level X relationship X flexibility) is conducted with the five contending tactics as dependent variables. 15 Table 4 reports a significant three way interaction between level, the relationship, and client management initial accounting position flexibility (Wilks" λ=0.922, F(5,166)=2.82, p<0.02), indicating that case specific accounting context matters in the use of contending tactics. As we are interested in the effects of level, we decompose the interaction to test our hypothesis by examining the level by client 15 We do not carry out a MANOVA on all 15 distributive tactics as the predictions are in the opposite directions for H2 and H3 and hence would cancel each other out in a MANOVA analysis. Table 5 Panels C and D show audit partners intend to use more contending tactics than the managers when the relationship is cordial and the client"s initial position is flexible (Panel C (Wilks" λ=0.709, F(5,36)=2.96, p<0.03)). However, note that this finding is driven, as was found above, by one significant contending tactic (CTD1) tactic (see Table 5 Panel D). Table 5 Panel B shows that audit partners and managers intend to use the contending strategy"s tactics to the same extent when the ACM relationship is contentious and the client has a flexible initial accounting position (Panel B (Wilks" λ=0.871, F(5,41)=1.21, p>0.30)).
Overall, some support is found for H2, but we point out that the support is dependent on accounting context. Specifically, partners are more likely to intend to use the contending strategy than managers, however, that intended use is more nuanced than the generic negotiation literature would suggest. The planned use of the contending strategy in this case is dependent on the accounting context and is hinged on one tactic (e.g., CTD (1)).
Tests of H3 Concessionary and Compromising Strategy Usage
To test whether less experienced managers intend to utilize concessionary and compromising strategies more than partners (H3), we conduct a 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA (level X relationship X flexibility) where the dependent variables are the five concessionary tactics and the five compromising tactics. We find an overall level by client initial position flexibility interaction (Wilks" λ=0.835, F(10,157)=3.11, p<0.002, results not tabulated) again underscoring the importance of context in ACM negotiation. suggesting that when the client"s initial position is more flexible, there are no differences between the partners" and managers" intended use of the compromising strategy"s tactics.
However, the results of a 2 X 2 MANOVA (level X relationship with inflexible client, results not tabulated) find a significant level main effect (Wilks" λ=0.858, F(5,81)=2.68, p<0.03) with the other main effect and interaction insignificant. Follow up univariate tests in Table 7 Panel B
show that when the client"s initial accounting position is inflexible, we find managers are more willing than partners to compromise, as evidenced by the managers" intention to employ three of the five compromising tactics at a significantly higher level than the partners. These findings provide support for H3, but again, we must qualify these results due to their dependence on the specifics of the accounting context. A closer examination of the pattern of interactions in Table 7 Panel B reveals that partners are more sensitive to the accounting context than the managers are.
We interpret the relative increased partner sensitivity to be consistent with the conjecture that the partners" relatively greater degree of task experience and power/status in ACM negotiations leads them to be more sensitive to the accounting contextual features that are relevant to the negotiation (Shelton 1999; Gibbins et al. 2001 ).
Overall, H3 is supported. Managers intend to use concessionary and compromising strategies more than partners. We note, however, that the results for the compromising strategy are dependent on the accounting context. In contrast, for this case, both the partners" and managers" planned use of concessionary tactics and their differences in their planned use are independent of the accounting context. Given the general conclusion in the audit negotiation research that ACM negotiation is highly contextually driven (Gibbins et al. 2001) , it should not be a surprise that accounting context matters. However, after combining the results of H2 and H3, the differential effects of context on partners" and managers" intended approaches to ACM negotiations are intriguing, especially given that managers frequently accompany partners at ACM negotiations (Gibbins et al. 2007 ). Despite our comprehensive reading of the generic negotiation literature, we had not expected level by context interactions for the planned use of distributive negotiation strategies. Nevertheless, the interactions of level with the accounting context does not undermine the critical conclusion -audit managers" intended negotiation strategy, be it distributive or integrative, differs from audit partners" intended negotiation strategy, and therefore, it is problematic to substitute audit managers for audit partners in ACM negotiations.
Additional Analysis
To examine the issue of whether there is a "pure" experience effect, we carry out two additional analyses. First, we eliminate all managers with less than 10 years of experience and compare the remaining managers with the partners, which gives us roughly two partners for every manager that are spread uniformly across cells (sizes from 8 to 10 for managers and sizes 17 to 19 for partners). We believe that the appropriate expectation would be that the results presented in our paper would be replicated but be weaker, given the additional experience of these managers over the more junior managers that were eliminated from the sample. In some sense, we would be showing the incremental effect, however imperfectly, of the position or power of the partner role over the additional time to develop negotiation experience.
Our findings are consistent with this expectation. Table 2 Panel B"s expanding the agenda Level main effect becomes non-significant (F(6,98)=0.71 p>0.20); Table 2 Panel C"s problem solving tactics Level main effect drops to marginal significance (F(6, 98)= 1.72, p<0.07); Table   4 "s contending tactics three way interaction of Level with Position and Flexibility remains significant (F(5,99)=2.91, p<0.02), as are the follow-up two way interactions and simple effects; Table 6 Panel A"s concessionary tactics Level main effect becomes non-significant, although it borders on being marginal (F(5,97) = 1.40, p<0.14); and Table 6 Second, we elicited participants" responses to the following question "How frequently have you experienced difficult accounting measurement and valuation issues similar to the issue described in the case with your audit clients?" on an eleven point scale anchored with "Never"
and "All clients". This measure is somewhat problematic in that it is termed in frequency of negotiation by percentage of clients and may not capture negotiation experience over time, but rather, only across total client base. This continuous measure, when substituted for "level" and following an analogous argument to the expectations above, but with all participants, lead to findings of non-significance for expanding the agenda; marginal significance for problem solving; the same results as reported in the main results for contend, albeit a little weaker; marginal significance for concessionary; and the same results, though slightly weaker than reported in the main results, for compromising. Hence, both these additional analyses provide support for our assertion that it is a combination of negotiation experience and power of position that causes partners to intend to use different negotiation strategies than managers when preparing for negotiations.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study investigates the effects of differential audit firm level on intended auditor negotiation behavior. The overall pattern of our results illustrates that managers and partners intend to use different negotiation strategies, and therefore substituting managers for partners in order to increase audit efficiency may in some contexts undermine audit effectiveness.
Specifically, key accounting context features important to ACM negotiations (Gibbins et al. 2001 : Gibbins et al. 2005 , 2009 McCracken et al. 2008 ) are extended in this paper to include the hierarchy in the audit firm (see also Brown and Wright 2008 who call for research in this area). The combination of greater experience and power/status, which are normally intertwined in the audit firm setting with partners having greater experience and power/status than most managers, has not been studied in the generic negotiation research, as demonstrated by our conflicting predictions for intended use of integrative strategies based on differences in the base literature (Thompson 1990; De Dreu and van Kleef 2004) . Our integrative strategies results
show that partners are less likely than managers to use the integrative strategy, "expanding the agenda", and while less conclusive, our results also suggest that partners are less likely than managers to use the integrative strategy, "problem solving". Both of these findings are consistent with the power/status literature in the generic negotiation research. Hence, our first contribution builds on the initial findings of Trotman et al. (2007) that suggest that rank may impact prenegotiation judgments, as we document the potential for different negotiation outcomes due to different planned strategy use by partners and managers. However, we find that this difference is not due to years of experience, but rather, to power/status differences based on comparisons to findings in other negotiation research.
Focusing on partners" and managers" intended distributive strategy usage, theory from the experience and power/status generic negotiation literatures suggests the same directional differences in partners" and managers" intended use of distributive negotiation strategies, which could transfer to our ACM setting. The specific predicted pattern is partners would be more likely to intend to use the contending strategy and managers would be more likely to intend to use the compromising and concessionary strategies (Thompson 1990; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004) . We find, as hypothesized, that managers are less likely to use the contending strategy and more likely to use the concessionary and compromising strategies than partners. Our conclusions, however, must be qualified by the interaction of level with the accounting context factors embedded in the experimental case (prior client relationship and flexibility of client"s initial accounting position). An exception is the less commonly used concessionary strategy, where we find managers are more likely to intend to use this strategy than the partners, irrespective of the accounting context. When examining the pattern of the interactions, we see a greater reaction to the accounting context by the partners than by the managers (e.g., Table 7 , Panel B), again likely due to partners" greater experience and power/status in ACM negotiations (Shelton 1999; Gibbins et al. 2001) . Hence, the second contribution of our paper is to reemphasize the importance of accounting context in ACM negotiations (as demonstrated in Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2005 Gibbins et al. , 2007 McCracken et al. 2008; Ng and Tan 2003; Hatfield et al. 2008) , given that generic negotiation theory does not suggest any reason for accounting context to interact with level, either in the power/status or experience negotiation literature.
Overall, from a practice perspective, audit partners need to be aware of circumstances where audit managers negotiate with client management, since the strategies and tactics employed and potentially the outcomes obtained by the manager may be different than if the audit partner had been involved. Until evidence to the contrary is found, it should be assumed that audit partners are the more effective negotiators, and thus, will have better negotiated outcomes than less experienced managers (Brown and Johnstone 2007; Shelton 1999) . Thus, concern is warranted based on these results that suggest that a manager"s intended strategy entering negotiations with client management may be, pending context, substantially different and more client outcome oriented than the partner"s intended strategy would be. Given that the generic negotiation literature strongly suggests that intended strategy frequently drives outcomes, this could be worrisome, not just for researchers trying to document how "auditors" would negotiate in various settings, but also for partners if they are not aware of negotiations that managers are undertaking on their own whilst out in the field. While managers carrying out actual ACM negotiations increases audit efficiency (and employing them as research participants makes academic research easier to do), our results suggest that unquestioned use of audit managers as surrogates may compromise substantive ACM negotiation effectiveness (and research results).
As with all studies, there are limitations to these findings. First, practitioner participants for the study are from a single large international public accounting firm. However, by using only one firm, we control for cross sectional differences between firms that might exist, such as, differences in training and firm policies, human resource policies, audit structure and other issues that have been shown to vary across firms. With these additional controls in place, we are able to conclude that the negotiation strategy differences are due to level and, thus, are able to increase the power of the test that could easily be obscured with the noise in measures that arise from the mixing of managers and partners from different firms together. Second, with regard to the dependent variable, the study examined intended negotiation strategy usage which is not the same as studying actual negotiation strategy usage. Although this is a limitation, the theory of planned behavior provides persuasive evidence that, "…behaviors…can be predicted from intentions with considerable accuracy" (Ajzen 1991, 186) . Research in auditing (e.g., BameAldred and Kida 2007) also supports this planned strategy-outcome linkage. In addition, although our experimental instruments were rated by our participants as being realistic and easy to understand, they are based on a single case, calling into question whether the results are case specific. Future research, therefore, should examine negotiation behavior with respect to different accounting issues and contextual features. Also, our real world based negotiation case included a mix of clear cut errors and accounting estimates in order to maintain the realism of the adapted case. This misstatement was treated as a constant across all experimental conditions as we had no theoretical reason to believe it would interact with any of our treatments, however, a theory driven investigation of combinations might be warranted. Finally, the current study does not measure auditor participants" prior negotiation experience as well as it could and does not measure self-assessment of power at all. Although this is a limitation, the underlying assumption that partners have a higher degree of negotiation task experience (e.g., Gibbins et al. 2001) and power/status is well documented in the audit literature (e.g., Dirsmith et al. 1997 ).
Overall, our research was specifically designed to address issues related to level differences within an accounting firm when carrying out negotiations with client management. In addition, we sought to tease out whether these differences in intended negotiation strategy were due to experience or power/status. Our study is the first, we believe, to directly study these issues from both a practice and a research effects perspective in a tightly controlled manner and to demonstrate that power/status appears to drive differences in audit partner and manager approaches to negotiation, at least for integrative strategies. *One partner reported less than ten years of audit experience; however the audit firm head of human resources informed us upon inquiry that there are no partners in their firm with less than ten years of audit experience and it was rare to have a new audit partner appointed with less than 12 years of experience, normally 14. Hence we reclassified that partner into the next highest category. 
